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Abstract 
 
Recent developments in planning law in England have produced a legal framework which 
relies upon localism and a presumption in favour of sustainable development. The former 
goal is achieved through the primacy given to a local development plan: the latter through 
the guidance in the National Planning Policy Framework. These obligations are internally 
incoherent, but they also produce incoherence when they operate simultaneously. This 
springs from a lack of commitment to any one understanding of the terms used, to the 
competing ideologies behind them, and to the scale and space within which these policies are 
to be given force.  
 
Planning policy conceals this lack of coherence by relying on reasonableness and balance to 
achieve practical and sensible outcomes. When this is brought into a legal context however, 
and rendered justiciable, the masking of the incoherence is no longer effective, and legal 
problems result. This paper discusses these legal problems and demonstrates this incoherence. 
Planning decision-makers are required, as a result of these difficulties, to reconcile the 
irreconcilable, and to operate in the face of an uncertain and unpredictable legal position.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Following the election of a Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition government in England 
in 2010, significant reforms to the planning system have been introduced. These reforms 
followed a sustained attack from the Conservatives on planning under New Labour, which 
was characterised as being overly bureaucratic, overly centralised and anti-development 
(Conservative Party 2010). The subsequent changes have thus included the reduction in 
volume of national planning policy guidance, the removal of the regional tier of planning 
policy, and the introduction of a ‘presumption in favour of sustainable development’ which is 
now seen as “a golden thread running through both plan-making and decision-taking” (United 
Kingdom, 2012b [14]). These reforms are bound together by the overarching Conservative 
ethos of ‘localism’, characterised by the attempt to devolve more power to local areas and a 
supposed end to ‘top-down’ planning. 
 
One result of these reforms is that three strands now clearly dominate the current agenda for 
English planning: reduction of ‘regulatory burdens’ (United Kingdom, 2014b) and increased 
flexibility where such burdens are unavoidable; maintenance of a high level of environmental 
protection without stifling development (United Kingdom, 2013); and localised decision-
making (United Kingdom, 2012a; United Kingdom, 2012b). These policy themes are easily 
identified, but are they easily justiciable? 
 
It is the argument of this paper that, when considered as standalone legal obligations, there 
are significant problems with the changes to and objectives for planning as set out above in 
terms of the three dominating strands:  the definitions of both local and sustainable 
development are unclear, and the conferral of autonomy onto local decision-makers is 
ambiguous at best. When combined, however, incoherence and incompatibility arises. 
Ultimately, these policies seek to achieve nationally mandated goals on a local basis (Taylor, 
  
2013, p. OP12). This simultaneously attempts to grant autonomy to local decision-makers, 
whilst controlling that ‘autonomy’ to ensure it allows for sustainable development on a 
national level. Just as environmental law and ‘localism’ make for uneasy bedfellows (Lees, 
2014), so too do the presumption in favour of sustainable development and the overarching 
ethos of localism. This paper explores these tensions, their manifestations in planning law and 
their impact on decision-makers who are obliged to reconcile the irreconcilable. 
 
It does so by firstly briefly reviewing some of the literature discussing the underlying 
inconsistency and incoherence that persist in planning. This review demonstrates that 
planning policy, which is intended to operate in practice in a coherent way, cannot do so as a 
result of incoherence which manifests in a lack of commitment to a clear understanding of 
core concepts, to a single ideology, or to how power should be distributed through space or 
scale.  
 
The paper then tests this reading of the literature by investigating how the currently dominant 
policy themes play out in English practice, with a particular emphasis on the decisions of the 
English courts. The evidence suggests that through its reliance on ‘sensible’ decision-makers 
and reasonableness in making policy decisions, English planning policy appears at first 
reading to be successful in masking its own internal incoherence. Unfortunately, as will be 
seen, once this policy is transformed into legal obligations through contact with the courts, its 
incoherence is exposed. Individual legal decisions may seek to repair the faults which have 
been identified through the deliberative process, but when individual legal decisions are 
viewed together, the collective inconsistency of the legal framework that arises is exposed. 
This process at the judicial level will be discussed in relation to localism and sustainable 
development. It will be argued that as standalone policies they become incoherent legal 
obligations, and when combined, the problem becomes not just one of incoherence, but also 
of incompatibility.  
 
2. Incoherence and incompatibility in planning 
 
The following brief review of the planning literature demonstrates that incoherence and 
incompatibility have emerged as significant themes in analyses of planning in England. Three 
broad concerns in the theoretical debate which are of relevance to this paper are identified: (a) 
ambiguity of core concepts in planning; (b) ideological contradiction in planning; and (c) 
spaces and scales of planning in the nation state. 
 
2.1 Ambiguity of Core Concepts 
 
“It is not new to point out that many of the central concepts in planning theory and practice 
are imprecise, vague, ambiguous, and opaque” (Taylor, 2003, p.92). Whether it be 
‘community’, ‘regeneration’, ‘sustainable development’, ‘policy integration’, ‘localism’ or 
any other ‘concept du jour’, planning theory, policy and practice is loaded with words and 
concepts which are neither coherently defined nor consistently interpreted, understood or 
applied (e.g. Cochrane, 2003; Davoudi, 2000; Furbey, 1999; House of Commons, 2011; Stead 
& Meijers, 2009; Taylor, 2003).  
 
This suggests that there is a risk that this lack of clarity over the meaning of core concepts in 
planning will lead to multiple, variable and incommensurable readings and applications of 
policy: in the context of such confusion and (sometimes deliberate) obfuscation, how can 
planning be a coherent process? There is therefore an anxiety in the literature regarding the 
imprecision of the language of policy and the related potential for the incoherence of the 
interpretation of core planning concepts in practice.  
 
When policy remains un-tested by law such issues can remain hidden beneath the surface of 
language. By using the examples of ‘sustainable development’ and ‘localism’, this paper 
  
demonstrates that when the flexible language of policy is exposed to the interpretative power 
of the courts, its latent inconsistency and incoherence is exposed as the law is forced to try 
and reconcile the irreconcilable. Of course, in coming to a decision, a prioritisation must be 
made and a particular ideological position may be given prominence over its competitors. 
 
2.2 Ideological Contradiction 
 
Some of the literature suggests that planning policy and law internalises tensions between 
competing and sometimes conflicting ideological positions. Foley was one of the first and 
noted a risk that should these inconsistencies become too “imbedded”, then they may 
undermine any chances of planning in Britain achieving any “coherent rationale” (Foley, 
1960, p. 227). This theme of ideological conflict in planning has been repeatedly returned to 
in the literature (e.g. Adshead, 2014; Fagence, 1983; Guttenberg, 2009; McAuslan, 1980; 
Reade, 1983; Taylor, 1980; Tewdwr-Jones, 1999).  
 
McAuslan’s assessment of the ideologies of English planning law is of particular relevance to 
this paper. Over 30 years ago, he identified three distinct and competing ideological 
perspectives in UK planning law: a) that the law should be used to protect private property; b) 
that the law should advance the public interest; and c) that the law should be used to advance 
public participation (McAuslan, 1980, p. 2). For McAuslan, the conflict between these 
competing ideologies in planning law were “one of the causes of the general disarray in, and 
disillusion with, the planning system” (ibid, p. 6).   
 
It is perhaps testament to the strength of McAuslan’s analysis (and also to the institutional 
and ideological resilience of UK planning law) that Adshead in her recent update to 
McAuslan’s work felt able to conclude that, “little has changed in the balance between these 
three legal ideologies and McAuslan’s overarching conclusions, at least in respect of the law 
and guidance on development control, remain good today” (Adshead, 2014, p. 192). However, 
McAuslan’s three ideologies should not blind us to other potential ideological themes in UK 
planning law. It is beyond the scope of this paper to unearth all possible candidates, but there 
are arguably also ideological themes in English planning concerning scales and spaces of 
governance which are partly manifested in the problematic concepts of ‘sustainable 
development’ and ‘localism’ with which this paper is concerned. 
Aside from McAuslan, the literature also emphasises the potential for contradiction and 
ideological incoherence in the European ‘spatial planning’ project, which emphasises an 
integrated, consensus-based approach to meeting multiple cross-sectoral priorities and 
agendas. Spatial planning has been criticised for its hubris in seeking to simultaneously meet 
the objectives of multiple and competing agendas (as typified in the problematic and 
internally inconsistent concept of ‘sustainable development’), as well as for its post-political 
suppression of agonism through a focus on achieving a problematic and fragile consensus 
which in fact prioritises particular interests (e.g. Allmendinger & Haughton, 2010, 2012; 
Buser & Farthing, 2011).  
This discussion of ideological conflict in the planning literature therefore suggests that 
decision makers in England face the difficult challenge of reconciling competing ideological 
agendas, while potentially at the same time being influenced by their own ideological biases, 
thereby giving conscious or unconscious priority to one over another.  Freeden’s 
‘morphological’ conception of ideology is helpful here, as it offers a way to think about 
ideology as functioning to ‘decontest’ political concepts by “cementing the word-concept 
relationship” (Freeden, 1998, p. 76), thereby shutting out alternative interpretations through 
the exertion of control over meaning. For Freeden, ideologies “straddle the worlds of political 
thought and political action” and serve as the “bridging mechanism between contestability 
and determinacy” (ibid). In the context of the English courts, it is legal decisions themselves 
  
which convert planning concepts from contestable to determinate and prompt specific 
planning action. 
This paper brings these themes to bear on cases which demonstrate that decisions made under 
‘localism’ and in supposed compliance with the ‘presumption in favour of sustainable 
development’ are riven with ideological competition and contradiction. The result is a legal 
framework comprising individual decisions prioritising one or the other which, when taken 
together, produces incoherence.  
 
2.3 Spaces and Scales of Planning 
 
Closely related to discussions of spatial planning in England, the literature also focuses on 
incoherence arising from the conflict between different scales of planning policy, particularly 
the national and the local. This can be seen as part of a broader debate about scales of 
governance and the locations of political power in the nation state (MacLeod & Goodwin, 
1999), which in policy terms has been manifested in the Coalition’s up-dated brand of 
‘localism’ (Conservative Party, 2010; HM Government, 2010; Localism Act, 2011). 
 
It has been argued by Hickson that localism can be seen as a “radical ideological critique” of 
the central state (Hickson, 2013, p. 408), but is based on a conceptual misunderstanding 
which holds that power can be ‘positive sum’, non-hierarchical, and may therefore be 
dispersed widely without losing its value. In fact, Hickson argues, it is more likely that power 
is ‘zero sum’, cannot therefore be dispersed, and more often than not takes the form of ‘power 
over’ in society and the economy, rather than ‘power to’ (ibid, p. 419). Localism as a concept 
may therefore be internally conflicted and incoherent as it is based on a flawed understanding 
of the nature of political power.  
 
Issues relating to scales of planning go beyond a simple national/regional/local typology of 
scale. The emergence of ‘soft spaces’ of governance and planning (Allmendinger & 
Haughton, 2009; Allmendinger et al, 2014) has exposed a further level of incoherence in the 
form of a disentanglement of practical planning processes from the system of formal statutory 
plans, potentially resulting in an uneven and fragmentary system in which the formality of the 
plan jostles against the relative informality of planning in practice (Haughton et al, 2013).  
 
This suggests that unresolved tensions between spaces and scales of planning may give rise to 
a policy and legal framework for planning which is not coherent. Tensions over the desired 
degree of local autonomy, over local participation, and the processes by which that is 
achieved, may pointedly manifest themselves once the policy which attempts to work around 
these problems becomes law. 
 
2.4 Summary 
 
An overarching narrative binds these three themes together. It is the one which holds that 
planning is not a science and, as such, it deals with what Rittel and Webber have called 
‘wicked problems’ to which there are no solutions “in the sense of definite and objective 
answers” (Rittel & Webber, 1973, p. 155).  However, it is paradoxically the role of the courts 
to provide such ‘definite and objective’ answers to questions of planning law on a case by 
case basis. This conflict between the very nature of planning as an activity, and the nature of 
the legal process is therefore prone to give rise to contradiction and incoherence in the 
resultant legal framework. 
 
Nevertheless is through the process of decision-making regarding the appropriate application 
of planning policy and law that the sometimes woolly concepts enshrined in legislation and 
policy are honed into a usable form, any ideological influence thereby crystallised, and the 
tensions between spaces and scales of governance addressed in practice.  But in so doing, 
  
decision-makers give priority to certain interpretations of core planning concepts, thereby 
emphasising one of a number of competing ideological positions, and endorsing a particular 
articulation of power through the state.   
 
This process will now be examined at the judicial level through the lens of ‘localism’ and the 
‘presumption in favour of sustainable development’ in contemporary English planning. It will 
be demonstrated that it is partly through this process that the incoherence and incompatibility 
of planning policy suggested by the literature is manifested. These underlying issues are 
revealed through the deliberations underpinning legal decisions based upon these policies. 
This will happen no matter how much the courts attempt to plaster over the deep-rooted 
incoherence by relying on concepts such as balance, and reasonableness. 
 
3. Localism 
 
Localism has come under criticism for attempting to impose nationally mandated goals under 
the guise of local decision-making (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2011; Layard 2012; Taylor 
2013). How is a decision “local” if it is designed to ensure that national targets are met 
(Taylor, 2013, p. OP12)? Furthermore, “local” is defined administratively, not according to 
criteria relevant to a planning decision (Layard, 2012 p. 136; Localism Act 2011, section 
1(1)). Such criticisms are well made, and suggest that localism is a focal point for the debate 
around appropriate spaces and scales of planning.  
 
These criticisms can be addressed, however, by highlighting that questions of planning are 
questions of balance, a balance to be struck by each individual decision-maker (Taylor, 2013, 
p. OP12).[ 1 ] Local autonomy can be balanced with national goals, for example through 
insistence as to ends, but flexibility as to means. The ideal of a flexible definition of “local” 
too must be balanced against the need to distribute scarce resources and a desire to avoid 
paralysing administrative complexity. Thus, in theory, inconsistency and incoherence internal 
to the concept of localism can be covered over by planning decision-makers exercising their 
‘reasonable judgment’.  
 
Localism becomes law through the “presumption” of the primacy of a local plan in reaching 
individual planning decisions.[2] National guidance, which of course forms a critical backdrop 
to such a decision, is relegated to the status of “material consideration”.[3] The local plan 
should only be departed from if material considerations, when taken together, outweigh the 
policies and justifications that themselves went into the creation of that local plan. Most 
importantly, the material consideration of the national guidance must also be seen to outweigh 
a local plan which, in a sense, has already explained its reasons for departing from national 
guidance, and been found to be satisfactory in so doing, by the Planning Inspectorate. The 
local plan, under section 19, must have regard to national policy. It does not need to comply 
with that policy. Nevertheless, there must be convincing reasons demonstrated to the Planning 
Inspectorate for the departure to be justified, and for the plan to be found to comply with 
section 19. Therefore national guidance must (theoretically) be “doubly potent” in order to 
rebut the presumption that the local development plan be followed since any departure has 
already been found to be justified.  
 
Thus, as Lewis J reasons in South Northamptonshire Council v Secretary of State for 
Communities and Local Government when discussing the impact of the NPPF upon a 
development plan:  
                                            
[1] Cala Homes v SSCLG [2011] EWHC 97 (Admin) at [48]; Colman v DCLG [2013] EWHC 1138 
(Admin) at [57]. 
[2] Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004, section 38(6). 
[3] D B Schenker Rail (UK) Ltd, Towngate Estates Ltd v Leeds City Council [2013] EWHC 2865 
(Admin). 
  
It is not saying that you can disregard the whole development plan and simply apply 
the Framework. Firstly, as a matter of law, of course, the Framework could not do 
that… Secondly, the Framework cannot of itself provide that provisions of a 
development plan are no longer applicable…. However, the Framework is a material 
consideration. The factors to which it refers may be material considerations that 
indicate that planning permission should be granted, even though that would conflict 
with the development plan. That may be particularly the case if the development plan 
is, in fact, out of date and is not meeting current needs.[4]  
In other words, the presumption in favour of the local plan expressed in section 38(6) cannot 
be overridden by the NPPF, and it is only if it can be shown that local needs are not being met, 
for example, that the national policy within the NPPF can be called upon to override that local 
plan. The NPPF is invoked when local needs demand it. Hickinbotton J in R. (on the 
application of Midcounties Co-operative Ltd) v Swindon BC too confirms the primacy of the 
development plan.[ 5 ] Similarly, in Chase Milton Energy Ltd v Secretary of State for 
Communities and Local Government, Straker QC states that, “the framework cannot, of 
course, alter the statutory required approach to decision making”.[ 6 ] “Local” (however 
defined), in this sense, retains its prime status. 
 
The problems of localism as a policy however do have impacts upon the coherence of this 
presumption. These problems undermine the presumption in favour of the local plan to such 
an extent that its status as a “presumption” can be called into question.  As Taylor (2013, p. 
OP12) highlights:  
There is a view about amongst some MPs and councillors that localism means that 
councils are empowered to ignore any government’s wish for ‘sustainable 
development’ and, where there is opposition to development, to minimise it all over 
again. Were this true, the NPPF would be disastrously wrong... Fortunately, it is not 
true.  
He thus argues that the legal structures have been set in place in order to avoid the theoretical 
problems with localism resulting in the stifling of necessary development and preventing the 
creation of workable legal structures. The “presumption” in favour of the local plan is to be 
balanced against the presumption in favour of sustainable development (Taylor 2013, p. 
OP12). Bird (2013, p. OP85) agrees with this approach stating that “experience is showing 
that there are some issues which do not lend themselves to local approaches and where a clear 
steer from higher order policy is required”.  
 
But this policy balance, and the nuance that Taylor (2013) portrays as existing, is not 
replicated in the legal framework. Indeed, such a balance would be very hard to capture in 
legal terms. How does one legally oblige a decision-maker to not ‘wish issues away’? It is not 
possible to balance compliance with law with compliance with policy goals, however hard the 
process of judicial review tries to achieve such an outcome. The attempt to transform localism 
into law is therefore riddled with inconsistency in the case law and in planning appeal 
decisions. The more binary nature of legal decisions reveals the internal incoherence of 
localism as a policy. The courts, as a result, are struggling to articulate the precise effect of 
the NPPF on policies contained within local plan, resorting simply to statements of 
‘balancing’. This is demonstrated in Chase Milton.[7] As Straker QC states: “it could be 
necessary for a local planning authority in a case where policies fall in different directions to 
                                            
[4] South Northamptonshire Council v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government 
[2013] EWHC 4377 (Admin) at [23]-[24]. 
[5] R. (on the application of Midcounties Co-operative Ltd) v Swindon BC [2013] EWHC 3775 (Admin) 
at [22]. 
[6] Chase Milton Energy Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2014] 
EWHC 1213 (Admin) at [10]. 
[7] Chase Milton Energy Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2014] 
EWHC 1213 (Admin). 
  
decide which is the dominant policy”,[8] but, crucially, although this is a matter for their 
reasonable planning judgment, that judgment must be guided by the NPPF. “The closer the 
policies in the plan to the policies in the framework… the greater the weight they may be 
given”,[9] and again, the NPPF, “can and does provide advice to the decision makers about a 
number of matters, including the weight they might choose to put on various 
considerations”.[10]  
 
Thus, the weight to be given to the local plan can be dictated (subject to reasonable judgment) 
by the NPPF. Contrast this approach with that of the Court of Appeal in R (Hampton Bishop 
PC) v Herefordshire Council:  
Whilst it is clear from other passages that the policies in the NPPF may affect the 
weight to be given to policies in the development plan, the duty to determine 
applications in accordance with the development plan unless material considerations 
indicate otherwise remains the same.[11]  
Once again, the underlying doubt as to the practical, if not the legal, hierarchy between the 
local plan and the NPPF is producing a body of case law which although not directly 
contradictory, contains subtly different instructions to a planning authority, and which when 
brought together demonstrates that the presumption in section 38 is not satisfactory in its 
interpretation. 
 
Local policy can be overridden therefore where the NPPF dictates that little weight be given 
to that policy. This is, although not in direct contradiction with section 38, certainly a 
limitation on the strength of the presumption in favour of the local plan. For example, in 
Sayers v South Hams DC[ 12 ] Kirkbridge reasons that the “golden thread” of sustainable 
development and local needs must be balanced, and where possible, a ‘win-win’ is the 
preferred outcome.[13] The “golden thread” however is also trying to mandate the adoption of 
a certain approach, and the ‘balancing obligation’ expressed in Sayers[14] clashes with the 
prescriptive approach expressed in Tewkesbury BC v Secretary of State for Communities and 
Local Government.[15] The reasoning in this case demonstrates very clearly that national 
guidance will, through the various means by which it imposes itself upon a local decision-
maker, unless there is a very significant and specific local factor to dictate a different 
approach, triumph. The scales are tipped in favour of the national guidance even though there 
is a “double-strength” presumption in favour of local plans.[16] Indeterminacy in localism, as a 
policy and as an ethos underpinning an approach to planning, produces indeterminacy in 
practice. 
 
4. Presumption in favour of sustainable development 
 
The key factor that tips the balance is the presumption in favour of sustainable development 
(United Kingdom, 2012b [14]). The need to satisfy the requirements of the presumption in 
favour of sustainable development is imposed onto local planning authorities at both the 
decision-making and the plan-making stage (United Kingdom, 2012b [15]). The meaning to 
                                            
[8] Chase Milton Energy Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2014] 
EWHC 1213 (Admin) at [35]. 
[9] Chase Milton Energy Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2014] 
EWHC 1213 (Admin) at [11]. 
[10] Chase Milton Energy Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2014] 
EWHC 1213 (Admin) at [10]. 
[11] R (Hampton Bishop PC) v Herefordshire Council [2014] EWCA Civ 878 at [30] 
[12] Sayers v South Hams DC [2013] PAD 39. 
[13] Sayers v South Hams DC [2013] PAD 39 at [54]. 
[14] Sayers v South Hams DC [2013] PAD 39 
[15] Tewkesbury BC v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2013] EWHC 286 
(Admin) at [64-65]. 
[16] See R (on the application of Sienkiewicz) v South Somerset DC [2013] EWHC 4090 (Admin) at [28]. 
  
be given to sustainable development is to be taken from the NPPF as a whole (United 
Kingdom, 2012b [6]). Sustainable development, is, in effect, conflated with compliance with 
the national guidance. The courts have been unwilling to commit to a ‘judicial’ definition of 
sustainable development, but rather turn to the NPPF itself. As Collins J states in Scrivens v 
Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government[17] when invited to provide a 
definition of sustainable development: “I do not think that it is desirable that I should attempt 
to do that. What is sustainable in any particular circumstance will depend on a number of 
material factors”.[ 18 ] This hardly represents a clear and coherent definition of such an 
important core concept in English planning, especially when it is borne in mind that the courts 
have given themselves the function of determining the objective meaning of planning 
guidance, and therefore of the NPPF.[19] 
 
The legal status of this requirement is complex: it is both a material consideration in a 
planning decision justifying departure from a local plan,[20] and a consideration which will go 
into the drafting of that plan. As Bird (2013, p. OP86) highlights, to date the presumption has 
been treated as a very weighty material consideration, and not as a true presumption, and is 
therefore a question “of balance rather than [being] capable of objective testing”. 
Nevertheless, a local plan which does not include or comply with the presumption in favour 
of sustainable development is likely to be considered unsound by the Planning Inspectorate. 
Although a balance is certainly required, there is a degree of “threshold” compliance which is 
likely to be needed. 
 
The justiciability of the presumption in favour of sustainable development in individual 
planning decisions has manifested itself in a number of ways. For example in Enodis 
Property Developments Ltd and Enodis Ltd v Uttlesford DC[21] the development was rejected 
because it would not constitute sustainable development. The presumption was directly 
applicable. What is most clear however is that the courts are taking seriously the instruction in 
the NPPF that the meaning of sustainable development is to be based upon the entirety of the 
NPPF (United Kingdom, 2012b [6]). However, the general planning law principle that the 
meaning of a policy is a question of law to be determined by the courts remains intact as in 
Baker v South Downs National Park Authority.[22]  
 
This means that, in effect, the presumption is not a presumption in favour of sustainable 
development as such, but rather a presumption in favour of NPPF-compliant proposals 
(Newark & Sherwood DC v Philip Rare[23]). In Reliant Building Contracts v Nuneaton & 
Bedworth BC[24] too Gregory invokes the presumption in favour of sustainable development, 
both as a reason to depart from a local plan, and as a reason for the inclusion of conditions as 
part of a permission.[25] It is also part and parcel of the interpretation of what a local plan 
actually says, and the general terminology as to what sustainable development means will 
influence the interpretation of the more precise provisions of the NPPF, just as the specific 
content of the NPPF will influence those general terms.  
 
In short, the treatment of the term is highly complex. Thankfully, the courts are not shying 
away from this complexity. The decision in Jimmy Cash v Three Rivers DC[26] and the related 
                                            
[17] Scrivens v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2013] EWHC 3549 (Admin). 
[18] Scrivens v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2013] EWHC 3549 (Admin) 
at [15]. 
[19] Tesco Stores v Dundee City Council [2012] UK SC 13. 
[20] Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004, section 38(6). 
[21] Enodis Property Developments Ltd and Enodis Ltd v Uttlesford DC [2013] PAD 55. 
[22] Baker v South Downs National Park Authority [2013] PAD 3 at [34]. 
[23] Newark & Sherwood DC v Philip Rare [2013] PAD 24. 
[24] Reliant Building Contracts v Nuneaton & Bedworth BC [2013] PAD 36. 
[25] Reliant Building Contracts v Nuneaton & Bedworth BC [2013] PAD 36 at [33]-[37]. 
[26] Jimmy Cash v Three Rivers DC [2012] PAD 40 at [45]. 
  
decisions of the courts in R. (on the application of Cash) v Secretary of State for Communities 
and Local Government[ 27 ] and Cash v Secretary of State for Communities and Local 
Government[28] show that the court will consider the delicate balance that a planning decision-
maker must strike in handling this complexity. So far, in that sense, so good. But there is a 
serious problem. The problem is at the heart of the presumption. The status of the 
presumption, in formal terms, is a material consideration which can justify the departure from 
a local development document as shown. So in Energiekontor UK Ltd v East Lindsey DC[29] 
the conflict with the local plan and the development is overcome thanks to the presumption in 
favour of sustainable development.[ 30 ] However, the ‘material-ness’ of national policy 
underplays what the presumption as a presumption must mean. This is because the 
presumption will not be a ‘background assumption’, but also an active participant at all stages 
in a decision-making process. Through its impact upon interpretation of both the local 
development plan and the wider NPPF itself, the presumption will have a ‘silent’ as well as 
an explicit effect. 
 
What is somewhat bizarre is that the outcome of the balance process which emerges from this 
complex position may have the consequence that: “it is entirely possible that developments 
which could not on any objective assessment be described as "sustainable" are nonetheless 
identified as such for the purposes of the NPPF” (Bird 2013, p. OP86). Thus, there are two 
difficulties with the presumption in favour of sustainable development.  
 
Firstly, there is the obvious incoherence that sustainable development is treated not as an 
independently identifiable criterion upon which to base a decision, but instead as shorthand 
for national policy as a whole. Secondly, there is the difficulty of treating a presumption as 
only a consideration that forms part of a decision. The presumption will have impacts at 
multiple stages of a decision, something which is hidden by simply referring to it as a 
‘material consideration’. This example therefore demonstrates the practical consequences of 
the theoretical concern over the incoherence concealed beneath the surface of core planning 
concepts (‘material consideration’, ‘localism’, ‘sustainable development’), the competition 
between ideologies within planning policy (‘sustainable development’ as shorthand for 
national policy as a whole, with all the competing agendas enshrined therein), and the 
appropriate space and scale of planning (tension between localism and the ‘presumption in 
favour of sustainable development’ in national planning policy). 
 
5. Bringing the obligations together – incoherence and incompatibility 
 
These obligations raise two distinct problems. Firstly, the way the obligations are structured 
results in an attempt to confer onto local decision-makers autonomy and control, whilst at the 
same time restricting and directing that autonomy (Fox Strategic Land and Property v 
Cheshire East Council[31]). National guidance will, in the end, triumph over local autonomy 
where that “autonomy” is not used to achieve the outcome desired. 
 
More seriously, when these obligations are brought together, there is not just incoherence in 
the degree of autonomy and the process by which that autonomy is granted, but also in the 
structure of these obligations as a whole.  
 
The reason for this is the status of the presumption in favour of the local plan and the 
presumption in favour of sustainable development. In most instances, the ‘presumptions’ will 
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be mutually reinforcing. In some cases however they will directly conflict. This can occur in 
two scenarios. Firstly, conflict can occur in the transitional period whilst we await the drafting 
and acceptance of NPPF-compliant local plans. Until that time, although there is a 
presumption in favour of the local plan, the fact that the plan is, policy-wise, out of date, will 
itself be a material consideration to justify rebutting the presumption in favour of the local 
plan. Such a situation is muddled, but it is in many ways simply reflective of the transition 
time required for local planning authorities to draft policy in accordance with the NPPF.  
 
Temporary conflict is therefore, arguably, acceptable. It is however less easy to accept the 
‘final’ legal position. There are multiple stages to the process which might result in a direct 
clash between these presumptions. Firstly, the local plan must pass through the Planning 
Inspectorate. In order to do so, it must be demonstrated that the local development plan meets 
the requirements of section 19 PCPA 2004. This demands that the local authority ‘have 
regard to’ national policy. For the most part, this ‘regard’ will result in the local plan and 
national policy being in step. What it does not mean, however, is that the local plan must 
comply with the NPPF. Rather, the local authority will be able to justify departures from 
national policy if they can show good reasons for doing so. It is in this situation when conflict 
will begin to emerge.  
 
There are a number of options for challenging a development management decision made in 
these circumstances which (as it presumptively ought to) complies with the local plan. Firstly, 
the local plan itself can be challenged. Passing the investigation of the Planning Inspectorate 
does not mean that a plan would survive judicial review.[32] The court may remit the plan for 
further consideration by the decision-maker and require that a particular planning decision be 
made, most likely, in accordance with the NPPF in the meantime.  
 
Secondly, it would be possible to challenge a particular decision on the grounds that it did not 
comply with the NPPF notwithstanding compliance with the local plan. Here, the court has to 
make a choice. Was the decision-maker reasonable in relying on the local plan, or not? The 
plan will have been found sound by the Planning Inspectorate and so at one level the 
departure from national policy has already been found to be justified. Thus, the court may 
also be convinced by the reasons that convinced the Planning Inspectorate for this departure, 
not only in general terms in terms of the validity of the local plan, but also in specific terms in 
relation to the particular decision. On the other hand, they may not be so convinced. They 
may consider that not to rely on the national policy in the specific case was unreasonable, or a 
failure to take account of a material consideration, notwithstanding the presumption in favour 
of the local plan. Such an approach is in evidence in St Albans CC and DC v Hunston 
Properties Ltd, where the court states that: 
It would, in my judgment, be irrational to say that one took account of the constraints 
embodied in the polices in the Framework, such as Green Belt, when preparing the 
local plan, as para.47(1) clearly intends, and yet to require a decision-maker to close 
his or her eyes to the existence of those constraints when making a development 
control decision.[33]  
Thus the NPPF policy is relevant of course to the drafting of the local plan, but also when 
considering the local plan it must be taken into account again in relation to a specific 
development, even if the local plan itself is already confirmed to be compliant with the NPPF. 
The NPPF can assert its weight even over a compliant local document.  
 
This comes about thanks to the fact that the content of the NPPF is deemed to be the 
definition of sustainable development. Thus development which complies with the NPPF is 
sustainable, and therefore there is a presumption in favour of NPPF-compliant development. 
This presumption, if not exactly mirrored in the local plan, will leave the court with a choice 
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between the local plan, which is presumptive, and the NPPF, which on its own terms is also 
presumptive. In weighing this balance the court is limited as to how to resolve any tensions. 
The review of the local decision is to be based on the standard of judicial review, not on the 
standard of correctness: ‘reasonableness’ is the watchword. This might help the court to 
balance its way out of the muddle, whatever the underlying incoherence. The meaning of 
policy however is ultimately a question of law, and for the courts to determine. This gives 
them a double responsibility. Firstly, they may choose to interpret the local plan differently 
from the local decision-maker so as to artificially or otherwise bring it into line with the 
NPPF. An alternative tactic would be, in determining the meaning of the NPPF, to conclude 
that the local decision has failed to properly understand the NPPF, and therefore sustainable 
development, and that therefore it has a fatal flaw. Both routes fail to grapple with the conflict 
between local plan and NPPF per se, even if the end result is the same. Importantly, this 
process reveals the incoherence and incompatibility which may arise from planning policy 
containing loosely defined core concepts, competing ideologies and tensions over the 
appropriate space and scale of planning, while at the same time appearing to conceal it again 
through the exertion of the interpretative power of the law in single decisions. However, when 
taken together, the incompatibility of these individual decisions can be seen to result in a legal 
framework which is itself incoherent. 
 
A more explicit approach would be for the court to admit the conflict and to then conclude 
that the existence of the conflict, which is itself a material consideration, plus the material 
consideration of the content of the NPPF, which is presumptive, outweighs the local plan. 
This can happen even though the plan was considered sound and justified in accordance with 
section 19. The court could conclude that the plan does not justify the particular decision 
because the reasons which are used justify the departure for the NPPF do not apply in an 
instant case. In so doing, the court would be giving greater weight to the presumption in 
favour of sustainable development than the presumption in favour of the local plan. Balancing 
presumptions is a route to incoherence.  
 
Even in a planning context where presumptions are treated as very weighty reasons for a 
decision, the essence of a presumption is that in the absence of evidence, a decision in 
compliance with the presumption will be justified. To take a hypothetical case, faced with a 
local plan, the NPPF, a planning proposal, and very little evidence as to the likely effect of 
development, the local decision maker has no reasons to justify departing from the local plan. 
Similarly, they have no reason to depart from the presumption in favour of sustainable 
development. There is nothing to “weigh” the presumptions against, and this is why 
presumptions, even when treated as weighty reasons, are more than that. They are a way of 
making a decision in the face of a lack of evidence. When there are two directly competing 
presumptions, a lack of evidence will prevent the decision-maker from legitimately following 
one or the other.  
 
The result of this is that the local decision-maker is required to reconcile the irreconcilable. 
Strategic thinking and forward planning will be stifled by the impossibility of actually 
complying with these legal obligations, and local development plan documents will therefore 
be vulnerable to judicial review. This problem is more than a difficulty in drafting policy. 
Certainly that is a valid criticism of the somewhat contradictory ethos of localism. But it is a 
more fundamental problem arising from the legal mechanism used to attempt to achieve these 
ends. The local decision-making process which forms a fundamental part of the philosophy of 
localism – consultation at a local level, and local determination of issues – makes meeting the 
requirement of achieving effective sustainable development very difficult. Map these 
difficulties onto the two levels of decision-making – the drafting of local plans, and the 
making of individual development management decisions - and the underlying semantic, 
ideological and scale-based tensions in planning can no longer be hidden by references to 
balance and reasonableness. The NPPF fails to commit to any underlying conceptual basis 
and therefore fails to understand the legal underpinning required to allow these new 
  
obligations to operate. The result: incoherence, incompatibility and inconsistency, and a 
major headache for local planning authorities. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Planning is arguably replete with incoherence – in the language used, in the ideologies 
internal to it, and at the spaces and scales at which it is designed to operate. Underlying 
disagreements are concealed by policy statements referring to balance and reasonableness. 
But when such policy must be considered in a judicial fora, becoming in the process 
justiciable and therefore crystallised into law, incoherence re-emerges.  
 
Deep-rooted theoretical problems within planning can be seen as purely ‘academic’ with no 
practical implication. Planning policy is broadly drafted, especially at a national level, and 
individual decision-makers are relied upon to reach sensible and practical decisions which 
achieve ‘reasonable’ outcomes. In such a context perhaps an underlying lack of commitment 
to understandings of core concepts, or as to the appropriate balance of power within a state, 
could be said not to matter. They do matter however, and they matter because once policy is 
brought down to an individual decision, in almost all cases a prioritisation must be made – 
localism, or sustainable development; autonomy or prescription, and this prioritisation is 
made by local planning authorities, planning inspectors and the courts. In so-doing, they must 
interpret the terms of policy and legislation. They must fix the meanings of ambiguous 
concepts, in so doing prioritising one of the competing ideologies enshrined in planning 
policy, and they must allocate power of decision-making to one authority over another. This 
paper has focused on this process at the judicial level, but it is equally likely to occur at local 
level even before judicial review through the ‘contested’ deliberative processes and 
‘crystallising’ decision-making pertaining to the local plan making and development 
management functions of local planning authorities. 
 
Incoherence in planning policy therefore produces incompatibility in the legal framework. In 
the English context this can be seen in reference to the legal mechanisms giving effect to the 
localism agenda and in the ‘presumption’ in favour of sustainable development. Both of these 
legal obligations are internally problematic, not least because they depend upon contested 
understandings of their central tenets. When brought together however, they are incompatible 
as legal obligations because they result in two parallel presumptions operating simultaneously. 
There is a presumption both in favour of a local decision, and in favour of sustainable 
development. In addition, the latter presumption is also central to the process of interpretation 
of the local development management decision. Without definition, and without commitment 
to an understanding of the language used, the ideologies behind them, and the spaces and 
scales on which governance should take place, we rely only on the skill of decision-makers to 
conceal this incoherence in reaching their ultimate decision. Such obfuscation may be 
practically useful, resulting in sensible individual decisions, but it also calls seriously into 
question the legitimacy of the collective regulatory framework and the power that it confers. 
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